Making Pass Plays Look Alike

Pattern reading is one of the most crippling tactics a defense can employ against an unprepared or poorly organized pass offense. Even a successful passing team can suddenly find themselves unable to get anyone open. Think about what it is like trying to throw against your own defense when they all know your plays.

I was actually kidding: if your own defense can always identify what you're doing, then that is probably a sign that you need to rethink things. The issue is that as often as possible the defense should not know for sure where the receivers will wind up until the ball is actually thrown. This is done by making routes look alike.

The first thing is that your eligible receivers must learn how to explode off the ball and make every route look like they are going deep. If a receiver can explode and make the DB think he is going deep, and then has the skills to stop and change direction in two (or sometimes three) steps, then he can always get open versus one defender. Imagine a pass play with four (or five) vertically releasing receivers: each could go deep, stop, or go in or out at any time. Further, no single receiver can afford to be double teamed until the intentions of some of the other receivers have been given away, at which time the ball should already be thrown.

In fact, most 3-step drop passing games and many timing routes look just like this. Below are some diagrams of possible combinations and routes put together (some put together quite casually, not all are vouched for as great plays).

Drawing the route tree can be thought of as showing what it is like for a defensive back: he is backpedaling and he sees all the potential ways that receiver could go. However, if he can pattern read, even if he doesn't know with 100% probability what a receiver is going to do, if he can narrow it down to one or two things, then the offense is on a slippery slope downhill.

So, if defensive backs have a hard time pattern reading vertical releases, then what can they pattern read? Well, they read routes that immediately show where the receiver is going, as shown below:

I.E. Shallow crosses and flat and shoot routes. Or in other words: the bread and butter of many, many football teams' passing games.

Homer Smith wrote a few articles that very convincingly decimated the usefulness of some of these routes, particularly the flat route. You can threaten no more than one defender, who can always take it away. In the world of football strategy, this is not how you win football games. You win football games by isolating your players in one on one matchups that they can win and score against and occupying two defenders with one receiver, thereby creating those one on one matchups. Defenses will trade one for one every single time. Think about what bunching or stacking receivers is intended to do, or the multiple threats that tight ends and H-backs can present.

Moreover, these routes a) are easily covered or "squeezed" by the LBs, b) they usually signal exactly what the vertical releasing WRs are going to do (i.e. if the slot flies to the flat, then the corner knows he will only run a go or a curl, but will not run an out route), and c) does not threaten the deep coverage so the safeties can help double team the downfield receivers.

I used to be a bit more sceptical, but I think it is safe to say that the NFL, from a strategy standpoint, is obviously the most sophisticated football being played at any level. (Though certain strategies, such as many option football strategies, are deemed too risky because of injury to the quarterbacks.) There is simply so much more time, money, and experience at every level of the teams--from players to coaches to technical assistants, and there is too much incentive and reward for success for it not to be.

Thus, I think it would be a fair test to say that if these routes are as useless as they seem to be on paper under careful analysis, then someone would have realized this, whether explicitly removing them on purpose, or implicitly they would get phased out when they analyze piles of play results and use the most successful rotues and packages.

A quick scan of any NFL game will show you that lots and lots of shallow crosses and flat routes are being called, completed, and used successfully. While running the risk of asking the obvious (or simply making the simple complicated), but why?

The first, and probably most important reason, is that these routes are simply shorter and easier to complete than other quarterbacks. Most are less than 6 yards, compared with the vertical stem routes, which are 10-15 yards (at least) downfield, and, knowing that we can use the Pythagorean theorem to determine how far the pass actually needs to go, this could be a 15-25 yard difference between a 5 yard route and a 12 yard route. This is important both because of simple success rates, but also because football teams and quarterbacks are human, psychological beings, and I am a big believer in getting QBs established early with easy throws to get them comfortable.

Second, they do focus on the LBs and the undercoverage, who are often weaker defenders. This is a less strong reason because routes with vertical stems can and still do attack these underneath defenders, but there is no mistaking it with the shorter routes.

Lastly, while you do immediately lose deep threats from the route, you can still create new route trees off these pass releases, creating new uncertainty for defenders, which is what I will discuss in my next article.

Using the Pythagorean Theorem

I once witnessed a discussion (read: argument) between two coaches on how difficult and how far two different routes routes were to complete. I can't even remember which they were discussing, I want to say a skinny post and an out or something.

Regardless, no less of an authority on the passing game than Hal Mumme interjected between the two coaches to inform them (in typical Hal Mumme "I'm a smart guy" fashion) that there was no reason to argue, as you can easily determine how far the pass is, and that this problem was figured out thousands of years ago: Pythagoras' theorem.

To recap for those of you who do not teach high school geometry:

In mathematics, the Pythagorean theorem or Pythagoras' theorem is a relation in Euclidean geometry between the three sides of a right angled triangle. A paraphrase of Pythagoras is :

In the diagram, the sum of the areas of the blue and red squares is equal to the area of the purple square.



Or, the common mnemonic about the sides of the right triangle :

a² + b² = c²

This works for any right triangle laid out on a flat plane.

To use a football example, imagine there is a QB who takes a 5 step drop (7 yards back), throwing to a receiver who runs a speed out (12 yards upfield). Let's just say that the receiver lines up 12 yards from the QB and the out part of his route takes him another 4 yards away from him (he's lined up tight I know).



Therefore a = 7+12 = 19 and b = 12 + 4 = 16 so c^2 = 361+256 = 617. The Square root of 617 is 24.89 or roughly 25 yards.

Thus, in this example, to throw a 12 yard out cut off a 5 step drop, then QB must have the arm strength to throw a 25 yard pass on a line. This knowledge is extremely useful when evaluating quarterbacks, the importance of arm strength, what you are asking them to do with one route versus another, and, maybe most important how you want the pass thrown.

The Dread Pirate Bin Laden

May only be of interest to a few of you, but those interested in the practicalities and legal structures regarding terrorism, and particularly the identification and prosecution of terrorists should find this interesting. From the most recent edition of Legal Affairs:

The Dread Pirate Bin Laden

How thinking of terrorists as pirates can help win the war on terror.

By Douglas R. Burgess Jr.

INTERNATIONAL LAW LACKS A DEFINITION FOR TERRORISM as a crime. According to Secretary General Kofi Annan, this lack has hampered "the moral authority of the United Nations and its strength in condemning" the scourge.

But attempts to provide a definition have failed because of terrorists' strangely hybrid status in the law. They are neither ordinary criminals nor recognized state actors, so there is almost no international or domestic law dealing with them. This gives an out to countries that harbor terrorists and declare them "freedom fighters." It also lets the United States flout its own constitutional safeguards by holding suspects captive indefinitely at Guantánamo Bay. The overall situation is, in a word, anarchic.

This chaotic state is reflected in, and caused by, the tortuous machinations of the U.N. in defining terrorism. Over 40 years of debate have produced a plethora of conventions proscribing acts ranging from hijacking to financing terrorist organizations. But the U.N. remains deadlocked on what a terrorist is. As a result, terrorists and countries like the United States pursue one another across the globe with virtually no rules governing their actions. ...

Coming up with such a framework would perhaps seem impossible, except that one already exists. Dusty and anachronistic, perhaps, but viable all the same. More than 2,000 years ago, Marcus Tullius Cicero defined pirates in Roman law as hostis humani generis, "enemies of the human race." From that day until now, pirates have held a unique status in the law as international criminals subject to universal jurisdiction—meaning that they may be captured wherever they are found, by any person who finds them. The ongoing war against pirates is the only known example of state vs. nonstate conflict until the advent of the war on terror, and its history is long and notable. More important, there are enormous potential benefits of applying this legal definition to contemporary terrorism.

AT FIRST GLANCE, THE CORRELATION BETWEEN PIRACY AND TERRORISM seems a stretch. Yet much of the basis of this skepticism can be traced to romantic and inaccurate notions about piracy. An examination of the actual history of the crime reveals startling, even astonishing, parallels to contemporary international terrorism. Viewed in its proper historical context, piracy emerges as a clear and powerful precedent.

Piracy has flourished on the high seas for as long as maritime commerce has existed between states. Yet its meaning as a crime has varied considerably. The Roman definition of hostis humani generis fell into disuse by the fifth century A.D. with the decline of the empire. But the act didn't disappear with the definition. By 912, pirates along the coasts of Western Europe who styled themselves as "sea-warriors," or Vikings, had terrorized Britain and conquered Normandy. In the early Middle Ages, with no national navies to quash them, pirates held sway over nearly every trade route in Europe. Kings like Edward I of England then began to grant "Commissions of Reprisal" to merchantmen, entitling them to attack both pirate ships and any other merchant vessel flying the same country's flag as the one flown by the pirates they had seen before.

By the 16th century, piracy had emerged as an essential, though unsavory, tool of statecraft. Queen Elizabeth viewed English pirates as adjuncts to the royal navy, and regularly granted them "letters of marque" (later known as privateering, or piracy, commissions) to harass Spanish trade.

It was a brilliant maneuver. The mariners who received these letters, most notably the famed explorers Francis Drake and Walter Raleigh, amassed immense fortunes for themselves and the Crown, wreaked havoc on Spanish fleets, and terrorized Spain's shoreside cities. Meanwhile, the queen could preserve the vestiges of diplomatic relations, reacting with feigned horror to revelations of the pirates' depredations. Witness, for example, the queen's disingenuous instructions saying that if Raleigh "shall at any time or times hereafter robbe or spoile by sea or by lance, or do any acte of unjust or unlawful hostilities [he shall] make full restitution, and satisfaction of all such injuries done." When Raleigh did what Elizabeth had forbidden—namely, sack and pillage the ports of then-ally Spain—Elizabeth knighted him. ...

IF THIS CHRONOLOGY SEEMS FAMILIAR, IT SHOULD. The rise and fall of state-sponsored piracy bears chilling similarity to current state-sponsored terrorism. Many nations, including Libya, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, have sponsored terrorist organizations to wage war against the United States or other Western powers. In each case, the motivations have been virtually identical to those of Elizabeth: harass the enemy, deplete its resources, terrify its citizens, frustrate its government, and remain above the fray. The United States is credited with manufacturing its own enemy by training, funding, and outfitting terrorist groups in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Central America during the cold war.

But the important lesson for us is not merely that history repeats itself. Looking at the past provides a parallel to our current dilemma but also a solution. The Declaration of Paris is, on the one hand, a recognition of shared guilt. On the other, it represents the first articulation since the Roman era of piracy as a crime in and of itself. The pirate, by this definition, exists like a malevolent satellite to the law of nations. "Considering . . . that the uncertainty of the law and of the duties in such a matter [as piracy] gives rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents which may occasion serious difficulties, and even conflicts," the declaration stated, the signing parties "have adopted the following solemn declaration: Privateering is and remains abolished." ...

DANIEL DEFOE, THE GREAT CHRONICLER OF PIRACY'S GOLDEN AGE in his General History of the Pyrates, described his subjects as stateless persons "at war with all the world," a definition that may connect contemporary terrorism to piracy even more than state sponsorship does. The legacy of the Elizabethan era was a diaspora of unemployed, malcontent mariners throughout the Atlantic colonies. By the late 17th century, they began to coalesce into small pirate bands, seize vessels at anchorages or on the high seas, and wage their own private wars.

Inflation on the rise?

From the Capital Spectator:

DEAD, OR JUST DORMANT?

Maybe it's not so benign after all. Producer prices rose 1.0% in July, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports. As with yesterday's news on consumer prices, removing food and energy from the equation lessens the pricing momentum, bringing the PPI pace of advance down to 0.4% last month. But 0.4% ain't hay.

In fact, 0.4% is the highest monthly rise in the so-called core producer price index since January's 0.7%. As a result, core PPI now running at 2.8% over the past 12 months—the highest since 1995. Yes, Virginia, that's 1995.

Inflation, if you haven't yet caught the drift, isn't quite dead. That fact promises threatens to be front and center when the Fed convenes its next Federal Open Market Committee meeting on September 20. Indeed, today's PPI report all but insures that another 25-basis-point hike in Fed funds is coming. The news on wholesale prices "raises the probability that the Fed will not pause [in its raising of interest rates] this year," Anthony Chan, senior economist at J.P. Morgan Asset Management tells Reuters today.

This all comes after last week's FOMC statement that core inflation "has been relatively low in recent months…." Perhaps it's time for the Fed to rethink.

While these inflationary pressures may be driven primarily by energy prices (oil, etc) economists shouldn't be so quick to pooh-pooh that, as its effects are quite real. Backing me up on this is Wal-Mart (and everyone who has filled up a gas tank recently) who noted that the rise in energy prices has disproportionately hurt the retail giant's primary customer base.

Yet, as the Capital Spectator notes:

Meanwhile, it's business as usual on Wall Street, which is to say that short-term trading retains the allure of the moment over buy and hold. Indeed, the VIX index, a measure of the equity market's price volatility, is on the rise this month. We're all day trader's now.

I've Moved....Again!

I truly apologize for the inconvenience, but I've changed addresses again. Double apologies to those still being redirected from the freeservers site, but I can't get some of the old webmasters to change their links.

After being hit almost daily with their daily bandwidth exceeded blockade I had to switch. Anyway, this is the new location, and all future posts will be here, so please bookmark the new address. I tried to move some of the articles over, but, prohosting, in its final annoyance, doesn't let picture files be accessed from off-site webpages--basically they won't show up. So I tried to provide links back to the original articles for all of them; these should all remain working for you. Also, on the right I added a link to the old blog index for older articles.

Hopefully I can stay put here for awhile. Google owns blogspot, which for a long time didn't allow images but now does, so hopefully I get some decent service.

Lastly, a new article below on the the three-vertical route and pass pattern adjustments.

Three-Verticals and Converting Pass Patterns

To kill two birds with one stone, I will continue to elaborate on the topic of pass pattern adjustments that began with Spurrier and some other plays by discussing the three-verticals play, known as "787" or the corner/post/corner combination. This is a big-play pass play effective versus all coverages, primarily cover 2 man or zone.

In this play, here diagrammed from a base Pro-Set, the outside receivers will run post-corner routes, and the inside receiver, Y, will run a "middle-read" route, or "adjustable-8". The running backs will control the undercoverage with a shoot and a swing route. The outside receivers and the middle receiver have simple keys to help them adjust their routes based on the coverage and the leverage the defenders are using against them.



Below is some video of the Patriots running this play (though with tight splits for the receivers and flipped as I have it drawn up):



Keys for Outside Receivers
The outside receivers are going to read the "two Bs" we emphasize to them every day: Bail or Bump. In this case bail is any coverage with the defender off 7 yards or more as long as he takes his read steps backwards.

Bail Technique

In this case the receiver will get a free release and will run a true post-corner route, as shown below. Beginning with the outside foot back, he will release vertical for 7 steps and should reach at least 10-12 yards. He will plant on his outside foot and break at a 45 degree angle to the post for three steps, looking back at the QB on the second. On his third step he will plant his inside foot hard, open his hips and break for the corner at a hard 45 degree angle.



As shown above, we teach that if the corner stays inside he will break hard for the near pylon. If the corner stays outside or quickly is back over top of him, he will drive his outside elbow and plant his outside foot flat to the LOS, and begin to come back for the football. If this happens he will catch it at 18-22 yards (this requires QBs without strong arms to have great timing). I will get back to the QB shortly, but the QB is instructed to "throw him open", and the receiver must get to the football, whether it is thrown upfield or back flat to the sideline.

Bump or Up Coverage

For bump coverage, the corner may employ several different techniques: he may align off and then step up (roll-up corner); play hard man inside or outside; or be in cover two, aligned outside and playing zone. Each is shown below:



Versus a roll-up corner, the receiver must abandon his vertical step-based stem and must instead stem inside to get proper leverage.

Against man he will abandon his steps and look for the quickest vertical release to a depth of 10-12 yards. The move at the top is the same, if abbreviated. He will sell the post, look at the QB, then break for the corner. If the receiver does not beat the bump coverage he will get back over top and push vertical.

Lastly, against a cover 2 corner, he will free release inside to a depth of 5-6 yards, then push to 10-12, stick his inside foot to the post to sell the safety, then break high to the corner. He will allow the QB's throw to get him to the open area.

Middle Route

The middle-read receiver will take the fastest vertical release he can. He does NOT want to get slowed by the second level players. He will get a pre-snap and a post-snap look at the middle of the field. If the middle of the field is open (MOFO - cover 2, 0) he will go for it. If it is closed (MOFC - 1, 3, 4) he will run a square-in route.



He will take the fastest release and push to a depth of 10-12. If he reads MOFO he will stick his outside foot and head for the nearest upright. He wants to catch the ball at 18-22 yards, and is expecting to get hit after he catches it.

If he reads MOFC he will plant hard at 10-12 and will stick his outside foot and make a 90 degree cut. If he reads zone he will try to make eye contact with the QB and find the window between the linebackers to catch the football. If he reads man he will burst and sprint away from his defender.

Undercoverage Control Routes

Here, they are RBs, but they can also be tight ends, wingbacks, H-backs, etc. They will run control routes. The shoot is a straight route to a depth of 3 yards, no wider than the numbers. The swing is a straight run out from their original position (5 yard depth) for 4-6 steps and then they will look over the inside shoulder. Will get no wider than the numbers and no deeper than the LOS.

QB Drop and Reads

This is a 5-step drop timing based play, so the offensive line must be able to hold their blocks. The QB will take a 5-step drop with a hitch step, keeping his eyes downfield.

His primary key is the weak safety. Even before he understands coverages he must be able to find the weak safety and watch his movement. On this play, if the weak safety goes weak (cover 2, or lines up as a middle safety and rotates weak) the QB will read strong (Z-1, Y-2, A-3). If the weak safety stays in the middle or rotates strong, then the QB will read weak (X-1, Y-2, B-3).

Notice the QB reads outside to in on this play. This is a timing route and the primary timing is between the QB and the corner route.

As shown above, once the QB determines which direction he is going it then becomes a strict progression read, where he actually is reading the receiver rather than the defender, looking for open grass. This is similar to my article on the all-curl route, where the QB keys the middle linebacker and then does a strict progression. This also helps with "throwing the receiver open", and has actually helped cut down interceptions, since the QB has a better idea of whether the receiver is actually "open" rather than the reaction of one particular defender.

Below are diagrams versus various coverages, with the W/S circled:



Note: The QB needs to be be able to identify Cover 4. Since the play is designed to attack Cover 2 zone and man, and is very effective at it, you can expect the D to try to catch you by playing Cover 4--where they outnumber your deep receivers--and force an interception. With the W/S staying weak it indicates to the QB to go strong, which is good, but overall he wants to find the best outside matchup. We hope the middle route can control the safeties a bit, and the hard post-corner move can still get the outside receiver open. Regardless, this is not my favorite call versus Cover 4.

And below is video of the play as used by the Airraid teams. Courtesy of "otowncoach."



Conclusion and Other Uses

Below is a quick diagram of the play from a one-back formation, and the route shown for play action from the I-formation. It matters little to your players what wrinkles you add to it, but, as per my article on personnel and formations, it can matter a lot to the defense. The idea is to get you doodling; it can be aplied to lots and lots of situations.



This is one of my favorite passes. It is extremely adaptable to many offenses, formations, personnel, and situations. Furthermore, it is an aggressive pass play but also is very precise and can be well protected. It is not just a heave or throw without purpose. It is part of a well-crafted, timing-based passing attack.

Substitutions, Personnel, and Formations

Anyone who has watched Edge NFL Matchup (the best football show on television by far) is familiar with the idea of "matchups" or "formationing". However, rarely is the concept used properly by coaches. Often, even experienced coaches will give lip service to "using multiple formations" and that, without purpose, if you run X number of plays in Y formations it somehow inherently makes you a better offense. Further, tactical substitution is even less understood. Sometimes not substituting is tactical (i.e. the wishbone or run and shoot looks the same pre-snap every play), but substitution and formationing are tools to be used by the crafty coach.

The great advantage to formations and substitution versus new plays and schemes as a tactic is that new schemes and plays require the coaches and players to learn something new. Whereas, on the whole, a formation, once learned, can be used over and over in many different situations, and a personnel grouping only requires that other players learn certain responsibilities (which can sometimes be demanding if that player is required to learn several significantly different positions). However, the coach can pretty much substitute or throw in a new formation at will, and the players pretty much will execute their task regardless of who is in the game or what the formation is.

Formationing

I will discuss this the least, since the literature and discussion of formationing is more widely available, and I think the most useful approach to this is for individual coaches to spend some time doodling it onto paper to see what can be discovered on their own.

However, this is the first tool used. Each defense has various strengths and weaknesses, and often defensive coaches, consciously or unconsciously, will often try to overcompensate for these weaknesses through personnel or tactics, so that creates further games. However, knowing these strengths and weaknesses is important for any offensive coach. For example two situations are digrammed:



On the left, the offense lines up in trips, which is troublesome for a defense that wants to play cover 2. The three frontside receivers require coverage from the undercoverage defenders, and the QB and RB can option or run the ball to either side, putting the inside linebackers in a bind. Further, with a favorable matchup, X versus the single cornerback presents different problems, particularly for slant routes. Thus the offense can kind of work a progression of frontside quick passes, strongside running to weakside running, to weakside passing, making the lives of the defenders, particularly those two inside backers, miserable.

In the diagram on the right, versus a 3 man front, vs what we would call a 3-4 strong stacked (or a 3-5 if the team uses this consistently as a base defense), we first line up in a balanced formation, seeing if the defense tries to load one side or another.

Most importantly though, with only 3 LOS defenders, we go two tight ends (we can go 2 backs and 2 tights if we truly want to be a powerful run team). First, we have six inside gaps (8 if you count off end runs) that the D must account for, and we can double team all of the LOS defenders and still have a free linemen, here the left guard, that can free release to block a second level defender. From here, as with the trips, the games would begin where we would want to run the ball, waiting until their contain defenders cheat inside or the free safety cheats up, at which time we would start throwing quick passes or passes off a run action.

Personnel and Substitutions

When planning for the year, it is important to identify your "studs" or the players that can change--and win--games on their talent, ability, and drive. These can take different forms, from gamebreakers to linemen who can pancake defensive linemen to a multitalented tight end or wingback, but they must be identified.

Second, you must flesh out your O with your best 11 players. I am a firm believer than you need a strong 11 players who are your "starters" and these will be the guys that help you score points and win games. I do not have guys that just stand out to the side or linemen we don't run behind, all are expected to contribute.

Starting from this helps discipline your thinking when substituting. Coming back to your studs and your best 11 helps prevent you from substituting without purpose or for purely cosmetic reasons; if I am going to take one of my best 11 off the field then I need a damn good reason.

The Value of Openers

First, when designing openers I like to, almost indiscriminantly, get the ball to some of my studs. As little as it should matter, psychologically it helps them get into the flow of the game, and they approach games more seriously and confidently knowing that we have plays designed for them to get the ball early when we practice our openers.

However, we also run lots of formations, motions, and a few substitution packages to get a feel for the defense. First, this can send them scrambling to see what we've thrown at them, but, most importantly, we want to see what they do. Do they put a linebacker or a safety on this guy? Do they shift their backers over? Do they shade their DL? Different coaches watch for these adjustments and we confirm a picture about the D. The more unconventional your offense the more important this is. From my experience teams would line up in all new defenses versus us almost every week, so our weekly preparation had to be contingency based rather than definitely prescriptive.

The big question we ask during the week and seek to confirm early in the game is: "Do they substitute based on situation (down and distance) or based on offensive substitution? Is there a breaking point where they shift between one or the other?"

This is very important, because it changes our entire method of substituting. If we know they like to go nickel on 3rd and 7, then we need to anticipate the nickel personnel and maybe we want to stay in base, or maybe we MUST sub in quicker players or else our RBs and tight ends will not get open. Conversely, if they substitute based on personnel, maybe we can do a power package on 1st and 10 and they will take out their free safety who we really fear in the passing game but is a poor tackler. This will be worked on all week as well as mid-game.

Again, the great advantage of this kind of strategy is it does not require the players to learn anything new. We do like our players to be smart (I used to tell them that by the time they leave I hoped they could all be coaches), but it doesn't require extra practice time to do this kind of stuff. A new trap play does.

Walkthrough of Situation

To help highlight what I mean, I will walk through one simple situation. Let's say we are a base pro-set team, with a halfback, fullback, tight end, split end and flanker. W want to make an adjustment and line up with the halfback split out as a receiver, so we move him outside of the split end and we look to see how the defense adjusts, as diagrammed below.



First, do they cover him at all? If they play way off, we may want to throw an immediate pass to H, who is our best runner, out in space. I've called this, seen our halfback make some people miss and score a long TD. Makes you feel like a genius, but is so obvious!



Here, they play man or some kind of "up" coverage. Importantly, since the cornerback's rule is probably something along the lines of "take the widest man" then our split end, our best or second-best receiver and route runner, is now matched up with a linebacker (it could also be a safety, and this could be advantageous as well).

Let's just say that it is pleasing to look up and see one of your speedy guys being covered by someone with their number in the 50s (or up!).

Obviously here we would try to isolate our split end on this player and let him beat his man on a pass route.

In the diagrams below the defense matches up with the corner on the split end and moves the LB out. Aside from the passing game, this is helpful for the run game, as we have taken a better run defender outside. Anyway, though, we now have H matched up on the outside with a LB.



Above we show the RB versus this backer in the backfield or split out. While he can run many routes from the backfield, he is not the threat deep that he would be, and the LB has more help from his safety and other cover man inside. However, split out on the sideline, he is on an island, and must first defend against the straight go or fade route (also the easiest to teach a RB who otherwise needs to learn other responsibilities).



Lastly, if we have been successful with all of these tactics the defense may get fed up and rotate a zone over to this side. First, we realize that we still have a strong run formation strong with our tight end. Second, it is a 3 receiver side, and we can flood the zone to this side where we can achieve an advantage. Thus are the cat and mouse games of offense vs. defense.

Motion and Shifting

I will be brief here, but motioning and shifting are easily applied to the concepts shown in this article.

The first thing about motioning or shifting is that they achieve the same purposes as formationing and substitution--it is the final formation that truly matters--but they generally give the defense less time to adjust and see what you are doing.

Motion

There is lots of overlap between motioning and formationing, but here is a brief list of reasons to motion (mostly taken from Bill Walsh).

1. Create a certain mismatch
2. Force the defense into a certain coverage
3. Put a player in best position to do a job (i.e. motion a RB out to go deep)
4. Confuse the defense's responsibilities
5. Disguise the play by breaking a formation tendency
6. Give them more to think about (motion causes emotion!)
7. Force defense into revealing keys (can be misleading at times)

Do NOT use motion cosmetically. If you are just motioning to motion, because you think you should, then you are wasting time and throwing off your offensive rhythm. You are better off getting to the line and calling the play on a quick count.

The special case of orbit motion or return motion, where a player motions in, usually to the center, and then goes back out to where he was, is on its way out. At one time this was very effective for determining if the defense was in man or zone, but has become increasingly less telling, and you see it less and less at the higher levels of football. If you see value in this motion then by all means use it, but its usefulness is decreasing.

Shifting

Shifting, as compared with motion has a few strengths and weaknesses. First, its strengths are that more than one player can shift at a time, and, as shown below, you can actually change the strength of a formation (which can be done with motion but not as easily or dramatically). This is maybe the most powerful adjustment at the LOS you can make.



The primary weakness of a shift is that your players must be set before the snap, giving the defense some time to adjust, while motion allows less.

Conclusion

This is the probing approach to formationing and personnel. It is not reactive in the passive sense. "Take what the defense gives you" has been changed from useful advice to a condemnation of conservative playcalling.

However, to some extent, it is still true when approaching the game tactically. This is formationing, shifting, and substituting with a purpose: intelligent strategy incorporates what the other team is doing, while staying true to your team's strengths.

Moreover, football is still a game of talent and people. If their 11 are better than yours, it probably matters little whether H is in the backfield or lined up wide as a receiver or if you shift your tight end from one side to the other. However, you look for what you can get. If you can find one personnel advantage then you can potentially trigger a structural change that can open up the rest of your offense and put your other players in position to succeed and contribute.

During a game you may have 2, 3, or 4 of these little mini-games going on. Moving this guy here, motioning that guy there, recreating the formation and doing something different, etc. A well designed and well taught offense can do these without confusing your players, putting the D in a bind. Conversely, a well designed and well taught defense can react to all these little offensive tactics and still let their players just go out there, play some football, and hit somebody.

To reiterate a running theme, football is a very simple game. The actual concepts you use, the number of ways to put 11 (or 22) pieces on the field is more finite than we think. All we can do is to teach our players as best we can during the weeks and then on gameday put them in the best position to succeed.

Throwing the Slant

The slant is one of the most potent but often one of the most poorly executed routes in all of football.

The biggest problem I see is that players and coaches alike need to remember to slow down. The slant is a route where everything is under control. The route is never run at full speed and the pass is very, very far from being a bullet.

The route should be run at almost no more than 3/4 speed, if not just a bit more. The receiver will explode off the ball but will handle the rest under control. The pass is a touch pass. It is thrown on a rhythm and will hit the receiver one foot in front of the numbers, but as a general rule (which helps with a variety of coverages) the ball will be thrown away from the defenders, rather than directly to the receiver, if that makes sense.

We begin by teaching the route vs. air, and we like it most as a route vs. loose coverages or Cover 2 where the receiver won't really get interfered with.

We have our receivers begin outside foot back. It is a 3 step route for the receiver, meaning he will step outside foot big step, inside foot, and then outside foot. On this 3rd step the receiver will land with his toes pointing inwards and will pull and roll off this foot into a 45 degree angle. We like to teach a fairly skinny break on the slant (aided with our 4 yard vertical step and the fact that it is run under control). Versus cover 3 it will end up being a bit flatter to get away from the corner.

The QB will take a 3-step drop. Some coaches teach "3 big steps," we prefer to just have him take a normal 1 big, two small 3 step drop, and if he needs to hold at the end that is find. On the QB's first step away from the line he will be looking directly down the middle keying the safety and not giving away any clues.

Vs. air this thrown and catch should be easy. A lot of repetitions will help them get the timing down. It needs to be thrown quickly and, remember, it is still an outside route, meaning that it isn't meant to be caught over the tackle or anything like that.

The next thing we will do is introduce press man coverage. This goes back to all of your routes vs. man and your receivers must be able to release. We prefer an inside release, because we feel like trying to come back underneath the man defender is difficult. The receiver will use an escape move (our favorite is "where I want to go, where I don't want to go, where I want to go" and a burst. The receivers must use the hands well.) will get inside position, push upfield to 3-5 yards, lean into the defender and burst on his break. The ball should pretty much be on its way when he snaps his head around.



We don't use this route vs. Cover 4 much. Vs. cover 3 we prefer the slant/shoot combo, where we send #2 on a 0-1 yard shoot to the flat. Essentially the QB keys this flat defender but it is as simple as looking through a window, if he cannot, then he will look to the flat. Reps help the QB see this develop quickly. The better the QB throws this pass the more likely it is to result in a touchdown. The Rec will catch the slant, burst upfield, split the safeties, and score.



Vs. Cover 2 (below) we like the double slant. Some coaches teach to read outside to in, others say inside to out. We say you want to throw the outside slant and the inside slant is hot. What that means is that the inside slant becomes the first read if there is some kind of blitz leaving a hole in the zone, but otherwise he's essentially a decoy. We found there was not enough to be gained from throwing this inside slant into the middle of the LBs with the MLB ready to take his head off.



The inside slant will release at the inside hip of the defender over him, and burst his cut at 4-5. The outside receiver will step at the squat corner but isn't looking to mess with him, and will essentially run his 3-step slant at adepth of 4-5 and break skinny on the slant. He needs to be mindful of that Safety, and very often he may be required to catch the slant and then deliver the "Forearm of Doom" (as Tommy Bowden likes to call it) to this safety.

You can decide for yourself if you want your slant receiver to run his 3-step stem at the defender or to break straight upfield. We generally have our receivers run their 3-step stem at the outside hip of the defender, whether he is lined up inside, outside or what, but many coaches have success with straight stems. (remember, he needs to be looking at the face of the DB, not at the ground where he wants to make his break!)

Hope this helps. Big thing is to bring all of this under control. It doesn't need to be a 100 miles an hour, and that will likely be self defeating. Happy slanting.